Posts
Human Rights and Democracy Activists in Iran
According to reports, two prisoners who had protested the violent and inhumane treatment of Hassan Akharian, the head of cellblock 1 in Gohardasht Prison in Karaj, were taken to a torture room which has been recently set up in this prison and were subjected to violent torture for hours. They were then thrown in solitary cells in cellblock 1 known as the doghouse.
On Monday April 19, two prisoners from cellblock 1 by the names of Hamid Kheirkhah and Reza Jalilvand were taken to a torture room set up by Hassan Akharian. These prisoners were first shackled and them violently beaten with clubs and electric clubs by Akharian, and other prison guards including Amini, Mohammad Mohammadi and Goudarzi. They were beaten in the face, head and other sensitive parts of their bodies. Two clubs broke as a result of the severity of the blows. After a long time, Akharian stopped the beatings and told the prisoners that they had to insult themselves and their families for the beatings to stop. But the prisoners did not only refuse this demand, they also tried not to cry out from pain while being tortured.
These four torturers then sprayed the prisoners' eyes with pepper spray and tear gas. The tortures were so severe that blood was dripping down the prisoners' faces and their bodies were black and bruised and bloody. These two defenseless prisoners who were bloody and injured were then thrown in solitary without any treatment.
In the past several weeks Iranian regime has concentrated on breaking resistance in prisons commuted by arrested protesters and political prisoners, and their hunger strike protesting torture and inhuman treatment by attacking, beating, transferring prisoners to dangerous wards, poisoning drinking water or even arranging deathly attack on prisoners by paid prisoners.
Such reactions portray the real status quo of the unstable and highly immune regime in Tehran, in regards to International pressure and also the past protests in the country. It also indicates the retrogressive progress of the implosion, envisioned earlier on by opposition figures of this regime due to the above factors
What is important for us, as international observers and analysis is to verify that the wave of protests which built up to the protests heading through since last year June till only recently , has NOT died away but has changed form in tactic
On Sunday, April 18, at about 8 am, prison guards in Gohardasht Prison in Karaj violently attacked defenseless prisoners in this prison under the pretext of searching prisoners and threw them in the prison yard. These forces then started breaking and confiscating the prisoner's personal items in their cells. This attack continued until about 11 am.
In the end of the attack, Hassan Akharian, the head of cellblock 1 in this prison gathered all the prisoners in the yard again and started crying out insults using profane language against them.
According to other reports, the pollution of prison water and the constant lack of water still continue in prison. Another number of prisoners were taken to the infirmary after being poisoned including Morteza Sadeqian from cellblock 1
Such reactions portray the real status quo of the unstable and highly immune regime in Tehran, in regards to International pressure and also the past protests in the country. It also indicates the retrogressive progress of the implosion, envisioned earlier on by opposition figures of this regime due to the above factors
What is important for us, as international observers and analysis is to verify that the wave of protests which built up to the protests heading through since last year June till only recently , has NOT died away but has changed form in tactic
On Sunday, April 18, at about 8 am, prison guards in Gohardasht Prison in Karaj violently attacked defenseless prisoners in this prison under the pretext of searching prisoners and threw them in the prison yard. These forces then started breaking and confiscating the prisoner's personal items in their cells. This attack continued until about 11 am.
In the end of the attack, Hassan Akharian, the head of cellblock 1 in this prison gathered all the prisoners in the yard again and started crying out insults using profane language against them.
According to other reports, the pollution of prison water and the constant lack of water still continue in prison. Another number of prisoners were taken to the infirmary after being poisoned including Morteza Sadeqian from cellblock 1
Amnesty International
Hossein Khezri, a 28-year-old man, and Zeynab Jalalian, a 27-year-old woman, both members of Iran’s Kurdish minority, are feared to be at imminent risk of execution.
Both were convicted of “enmity against God”, in separate cases, for membership of the Party for Free Life of Kurdistan.
Hossein Khezri was arrested in Kermanshah in 2008, held in detention facilities under the control of the Ministry of Intelligence and Revolutionary Guards, and was later sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court in Oromieh, north-west Iran, for “enmity against God” (“moharebeh”).
His sentence was upheld in or around August 2009. He said he was tortured and asked for an investigation, but his request was denied in March 2010.
On 11 April 2010, he was moved from Oromieh Central Prison to an unknown location, raising fears that his execution may be imminent.
Zeynab Jalalian, from Maku, a town in the north-west of Iran, was sentenced to death for “enmity against God” around January 2009 by Kermanshah Revolutionary Court.
Before that, she had spent eight months in a Ministry of Intelligence detention facility, during which time her family had no information concerning her fate.
She is reported not to have been granted access to a lawyer during her trial, which she said lasted only a few minutes. Zeynab Jalalian’s death sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 26 November 2009.
In early March 2010, Zeynab Jalalian was moved from Kermanshah Prison to an unknown location, possibly a detention facility of the Ministry of Intelligence.
After several weeks, in late March 2010, she was transferred to Section 209 of Evin Prison in Tehran.
The precise reasons for her transfer are unknown, but the website Reporters and Human Rights Activists in Iran has reported that she said she is awaiting execution.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION Zaynab Jalalian wrote a letter the day after her sentence was confirmed, which was published on the internet.
In the letter, she claimed to have been tortured, and she said: “I asked the Judge if I could say good-bye to my mother. He told me “shut up.” The Judge rejected my appeal and refused to let me to see my mother.”
Kurds, who are one of Iran’s many minority groups, live mainly in the west and north-west of the country, in the province of Kordestan and neighboring provinces bordering Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq. They experience religious, economic and cultural discrimination…
At least 18 other Kurdish men and one other Kurdish woman are believed to be on death row in connection with their alleged membership of and activities for banned Kurdish organizations.
Some have had their prison sentences increased to death sentences on appeal
Hossein Khezri, a 28-year-old man, and Zeynab Jalalian, a 27-year-old woman, both members of Iran’s Kurdish minority, are feared to be at imminent risk of execution.
Both were convicted of “enmity against God”, in separate cases, for membership of the Party for Free Life of Kurdistan.
Hossein Khezri was arrested in Kermanshah in 2008, held in detention facilities under the control of the Ministry of Intelligence and Revolutionary Guards, and was later sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court in Oromieh, north-west Iran, for “enmity against God” (“moharebeh”).
His sentence was upheld in or around August 2009. He said he was tortured and asked for an investigation, but his request was denied in March 2010.
On 11 April 2010, he was moved from Oromieh Central Prison to an unknown location, raising fears that his execution may be imminent.
Zeynab Jalalian, from Maku, a town in the north-west of Iran, was sentenced to death for “enmity against God” around January 2009 by Kermanshah Revolutionary Court.
Before that, she had spent eight months in a Ministry of Intelligence detention facility, during which time her family had no information concerning her fate.
She is reported not to have been granted access to a lawyer during her trial, which she said lasted only a few minutes. Zeynab Jalalian’s death sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 26 November 2009.
In early March 2010, Zeynab Jalalian was moved from Kermanshah Prison to an unknown location, possibly a detention facility of the Ministry of Intelligence.
After several weeks, in late March 2010, she was transferred to Section 209 of Evin Prison in Tehran.
The precise reasons for her transfer are unknown, but the website Reporters and Human Rights Activists in Iran has reported that she said she is awaiting execution.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION Zaynab Jalalian wrote a letter the day after her sentence was confirmed, which was published on the internet.
In the letter, she claimed to have been tortured, and she said: “I asked the Judge if I could say good-bye to my mother. He told me “shut up.” The Judge rejected my appeal and refused to let me to see my mother.”
Kurds, who are one of Iran’s many minority groups, live mainly in the west and north-west of the country, in the province of Kordestan and neighboring provinces bordering Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq. They experience religious, economic and cultural discrimination…
At least 18 other Kurdish men and one other Kurdish woman are believed to be on death row in connection with their alleged membership of and activities for banned Kurdish organizations.
They include;.
Farzad Kamangar, Farhad Vakili, Habibollah Latifi, Sherko Moarefi, Ali Haydarian, Anvar Rostami, Rostam Arkiya, Mostafa Salimi, Hassan Talai, Iraj Mohammadi, Rashid Akhkandi, Mohammad Amin Agoushi, Ahmad Pouladkani, Sayed Sami Hosseini, Sayed Jamal Mohammadi, Mohammad Amin Abdolahi, Ghader Mohamadzadeh, Aziz Mohammadzadeh and Shirin Alam-Hoei
Some have had their prison sentences increased to death sentences on appeal
Mukarian News Agency
Motahareh Bahrami who was detained in the Ashura protests (December 27, 2009), was sentenced to death. She was arrested with her husband, son a relative and one her husband's friends on Ashura and there are reports that these five people were sentenced to death.
Motahareh (Simin) Bahrami Haqiqi, her husband Mohsen Daneshpour Moqadam, and her son, Ahmad Daneshpour Moqadam were all arrested along with one of their relatives Reihaneh Haj Ibrahim. Hadi Qaemi, a close friend of Mohsen Daneshpour, who was also arrested with them was also sentenced to death on charges of moharebeh (waging war with God).
One of the son's of this family who became a member of the PMOI years ago is in Camp Ashraf in Iraq which is the basis of the charge of moharebeh and the death sentences for this family.
Meisam Daneshpour, another son of this family confirmed the death sentences for his family and said, "The case is currently being reviewed and the final sentence has still not been announced to them". (Rooz Website – April 18, 2010)
Kurd political activist sentenced to death
A Kurd citizen from Sanandaj by the name of Habibollah Golparipour was sentenced to death by the Mahabad Revolutionary Court.
This man who has been jailed for more than 6 months was charged with moharebeh for propagandist activities in a dissident party and was sentenced to death based on article 186 and 190 of the Islamic Penal Code by the Revolutionary Court in Mahabad
Motahareh Bahrami who was detained in the Ashura protests (December 27, 2009), was sentenced to death. She was arrested with her husband, son a relative and one her husband's friends on Ashura and there are reports that these five people were sentenced to death.
Motahareh (Simin) Bahrami Haqiqi, her husband Mohsen Daneshpour Moqadam, and her son, Ahmad Daneshpour Moqadam were all arrested along with one of their relatives Reihaneh Haj Ibrahim. Hadi Qaemi, a close friend of Mohsen Daneshpour, who was also arrested with them was also sentenced to death on charges of moharebeh (waging war with God).
One of the son's of this family who became a member of the PMOI years ago is in Camp Ashraf in Iraq which is the basis of the charge of moharebeh and the death sentences for this family.
Meisam Daneshpour, another son of this family confirmed the death sentences for his family and said, "The case is currently being reviewed and the final sentence has still not been announced to them". (Rooz Website – April 18, 2010)
Kurd political activist sentenced to death
A Kurd citizen from Sanandaj by the name of Habibollah Golparipour was sentenced to death by the Mahabad Revolutionary Court.
This man who has been jailed for more than 6 months was charged with moharebeh for propagandist activities in a dissident party and was sentenced to death based on article 186 and 190 of the Islamic Penal Code by the Revolutionary Court in Mahabad
Human Rights Activists in Iran
Iran kills two tradesmen in border regionOn Thursday April 15, security forces in Marivan shot and killed two citizens identified as Khebat from the Roz Ave Village in Sarv Abad and Kiomars from Sanandaj.
According to reports, Kiomars sustained severe injuries from the shooting and died after being caught up in a river on the border
Kordaneh Website
Dissident student killed suspiciously in Iranshahr University
Keivan Goudarzi who was a math major at Iranshahr University in Sistan & Baluchistan, was suspiciously killed today. He was from Kermanshah.
The body of this student was found next to the transmission tower behind the university kitchen. He was active in Mir Hossein Moussavi's election staff and the reason behind his death is still not clear.
University officials have tried to introduce him as a worker who died because of electrocution.
According to reports, his face was severely damaged
Human Rights Activists in Iran
Two prisoners beaten to death in Orumieh Prison
On Sunday, April 18, two prisoners were beaten to death in cellblock 9 and 11 in Orumieh Prison by special guards' forces in prison.
According to reports, an ordinary prisoner identified as Iraj Gham Angiz was killed for unknown reasons by prison guards yesterday afternoon.
This report says that other prisoners protested this murder and prison guards under the command of Akbar Pishevar beat these prisoners to counter the protests.
In these clashes, Seifoddin Yahya Zadeh was struck on the head with a club and died instantly
Iran kills two tradesmen in border regionOn Thursday April 15, security forces in Marivan shot and killed two citizens identified as Khebat from the Roz Ave Village in Sarv Abad and Kiomars from Sanandaj.
According to reports, Kiomars sustained severe injuries from the shooting and died after being caught up in a river on the border
Kordaneh Website
Dissident student killed suspiciously in Iranshahr University
Keivan Goudarzi who was a math major at Iranshahr University in Sistan & Baluchistan, was suspiciously killed today. He was from Kermanshah.
The body of this student was found next to the transmission tower behind the university kitchen. He was active in Mir Hossein Moussavi's election staff and the reason behind his death is still not clear.
University officials have tried to introduce him as a worker who died because of electrocution.
According to reports, his face was severely damaged
Human Rights Activists in Iran
Two prisoners beaten to death in Orumieh Prison
On Sunday, April 18, two prisoners were beaten to death in cellblock 9 and 11 in Orumieh Prison by special guards' forces in prison.
According to reports, an ordinary prisoner identified as Iraj Gham Angiz was killed for unknown reasons by prison guards yesterday afternoon.
This report says that other prisoners protested this murder and prison guards under the command of Akbar Pishevar beat these prisoners to counter the protests.
In these clashes, Seifoddin Yahya Zadeh was struck on the head with a club and died instantly
AFP - April 19, 2010
Iran has hanged four convicted drug traffickers and a rapist in a prison in the southern city of Kerman, the ISNA news agency reported on Monday.
The report identified the executed drug traffickers only as Mehdi N., Feizollah B., Nazar B., Alam H. They were convicted for trafficking hundreds of kilos (pounds) of narcotics.
Another man, Hossein S., was also hanged after being convicted of rape, the report added.
ISNA did not give the date of the latest hangings, which bring to at least 47 the number of people executed in Iran so far this year, according to an AFP count based on news reports
Human Rights Activists in Iran – April 19, 2010
The Afghanistan government has announced that six of its nationals were recently executed in Iran. According to this report, the Afghanistan National Security Council said that the bodies of four of these people were transferred to Afghanistan on April 5 and April 16 via the Islam Qal'eh border region.
According to reports, they were hanged on charges of drug trafficking
AFP - April 20, 2010
Iran has hanged two convicted rapists in a prison in the central city of Isfahan, the governmental Iran newspaper reported Tuesday.
The report identified the executed men as Ahmad and Soleiman and added that they were sent to the gallows on Monday.
Iran has hanged four convicted drug traffickers and a rapist in a prison in the southern city of Kerman, the ISNA news agency reported on Monday.
The report identified the executed drug traffickers only as Mehdi N., Feizollah B., Nazar B., Alam H. They were convicted for trafficking hundreds of kilos (pounds) of narcotics.
Another man, Hossein S., was also hanged after being convicted of rape, the report added.
ISNA did not give the date of the latest hangings, which bring to at least 47 the number of people executed in Iran so far this year, according to an AFP count based on news reports
Human Rights Activists in Iran – April 19, 2010
The Afghanistan government has announced that six of its nationals were recently executed in Iran. According to this report, the Afghanistan National Security Council said that the bodies of four of these people were transferred to Afghanistan on April 5 and April 16 via the Islam Qal'eh border region.
According to reports, they were hanged on charges of drug trafficking
AFP - April 20, 2010
Iran has hanged two convicted rapists in a prison in the central city of Isfahan, the governmental Iran newspaper reported Tuesday.
The report identified the executed men as Ahmad and Soleiman and added that they were sent to the gallows on Monday.
By Michael Rubin The Futurist
Patrick Tucker, senior editor of the Futurist, interviewed AEI's Michael Rubin about his view of the future. Rubin's thoughts on Iran, China, the United States, and democracy are shared below.
The Futurist: What do you see as the best strategy the U.S. might employ to further the cause of human rights in Iran?
Rubin: First and foremost, the White House should use its bully pulpit. After this past summer's election protests erupted, the Obama administration muted its response, fearing that to throw support to the protestors might taint them. This is a valid concern, but there is no reason why the White House and the State Department can't speak up for broad principles, such as democracy, justice, free speech, and free association.
After the Berlin Wall fell, we discovered that Presidential rhetoric meant more to dissidents than we ever imagined. There's a tendency today to want to address human rights issues silently, but discreet diplomatic inquiries are rarely as effective as public support. Regimes prefer to murder in silence; when a dissident becomes a public symbol, not only does the cost associated with a dissident's imprisonment or murder increase, but the dissident's story can be a driving force in mobilizing public pressure, as it humanizes the abstract. We saw this in 1999, when Ahmad Batebi became a symbol of the student uprising when he appeared on the cover of the Economist holding a bloody shirt, and 16-year-old Neda, shot in the street by the paramilitary Basij, became a symbol of the situation in Iran in 2009.
There is no reason why the White House and the State Department can't speak up for broad principles, such as democracy, justice, free speech, and free association.
The U.S. government should take care against bestowing undue legitimacy upon the regime. When Iranians are taking to the streets in protest against not only the legitimacy of their post-election government, but also their system of government, the White House's reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran implies endorsement of the theocracy, and their efforts to engage a government which the Iranian electorate does not support also implies recognition. Instead, the White House and State Department might direct their comments to the Iranian public in general and, if necessary, simply refer to the 'Iranian government' or the 'regime,' as every president--whether Democrat or Republican--did until President Obama changed the formula.
Most controversially, it is important for the U.S. government to consider aid and assistance to Iranian civil society and independent media. For example, the State Department working through non-governmental intermediaries might assist programs which seek to document Iranian human rights abuses or help independent trade unions organize. Fears that U.S. funding might undercut the opposition and strengthen the regime are real, but misplaced. Opponents of civil society support argue that the presence of funding enables the Iranian government to taint all civil society work. The problem with this perspective, however, is that the Iranian regime always accuses its opponents of foreign connections regardless of U.S. action, so supporting civil society would not appreciably alter Iranian behavior. If fear of Iranian rhetoric toward its own internal opposition were to shape U.S. policy, then we'd also have to rule out dialogue, since Iranian security forces have taken to toward accusing any Iranian who engages with American institutions--Yale University and the Carnegie Endowment, for example--of treason.
The Futurist: What about in China, where the attendant economic risks from the Chinese sale of U.S. Treasuries are much greater?
Michael Rubin: U.S. support for human rights and free speech might antagonize the Chinese government a bit, but the chance that Beijing would respond in this fashion is slight to none. It's simply not in the interest of the Chinese government to sabotage the United States economy to that extent given the level of U.S.-Chinese trade. At the same time, turning a blind eye toward abuses in China also has some inherent, even if indirect, risk. The Chinese government has no incentive to reform and to correct government abuses against its citizenry. Economic disparities run deep from coast into heartland. Absent an outlet for dissent and a system which forces the government to be accountable to the people, there is an inherent risk of wildfire outbreaks of instability in China. Certainly, gentle U.S. prodding for democratization in China is in both our countries long-term interests.
The Futurist: Do you see the Iranian regime persisting in its present state until the year 2020? What might happen when it fades from existence?
Michael Rubin: If we take a snapshot of Iranian demography, it might look like the Islamic Republic is in trouble. The Iranian economy is stagnant, living standards are declining, and the regime can't provide enough work for young people finishing the university.
Time is, unfortunately, working in the regime's favor. In the years immediately after the Islamic Revolution and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged large families. The regime put up posters showing 'a good Islamic family' with a mother, a father, and six children. After the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, the Iranian government realized that it could not handle such a large population. Suddenly posters appeared depicting 'a good Islamic family' as having a mother, a father, and just two children.
As Patrick Clawson, an economist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy points out, the Iran-Iraq war years' baby boomers are in their 20s, precisely the age of the protestors. In five years, however, the number of 20-somthings is going to decline while the current protestors are going to be in their 30s, and beginning to settle down with young families, their personal priorities elsewhere.
The regime is nervous, though. There is no question that the regime is unpopular across a broad cross-section of society. The evidence for this is not only anecdotal, but also quantitative. Using Persian speakers in Los Angeles, polling companies have surveyed Iranians by taking every telephone exchange in Tehran, and randomizing the last four numbers and conducting what, on the surface is an economic survey but which also provides insight into political altitudes.
In September 2007, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reorganized and implemented what its new commander, Mohammad Ali Jafari, called the mosaic doctrine. Rather than orient the IRGC to defend against foreign armies--as it had been from the days of the Iran-Iraq War--Jafari divided the IRGC into inwardly-oriented units, one for each province and two for Tehran. Jafari argued that internal unrest and the possibility of a velvet revolution posed more of a threat to the regime than foreign armies, a judgment validated by the June 2009 unrest.
The key issue in regime survival therefore lies with the loyalty of the Revolutionary Guards. It matters not if 90% of the Iranian people turn against the regime so long as the IRGC remains loyal to the Supreme Leader. Western politicians can hope for muddle-through reform, but ultimately change will come when the IRGC defects, much like regime change came to Romania after Nikolai Ceausescu's security forces switched sides. The Iranian regime is aware of this, and so IRGC members are seldom stationed in their home provinces minimizing the risk that units will refuse to fire on crowds which might contain family members, friends, or neighbors.
If the Islamic Republic does not fall, then the regime will have made a Faustian bargain. The IRGC will become a predominant force, dominating not only political life, but also economic and religious life. What we are now seeing is a slow, creeping coup d'état. The Islamic Republic is becoming a military dictatorship, albeit one with a religious patina.
The Futurist: Of all the trends playing in terms of human rights at this moment, from China to Iran to the United States, which ones concern you the most? Which make you the most hopeful?
Michael Rubin: What concerns me most is cultural relativism--the willingness of Western states to accept the arguments of oppressive regimes that Eastern cultures simply do not uphold the same values of individual rights and Western demands that they should is simply new age imperialism. We see this primarily with regard to women and women's rights.
Communication offers the most hope. From telegram to radio to television to fax to IM and mobile camera and twitter, technology is empowering citizens and preventing human rights abusers from acting with impunity.
The Futurist: Paint us a picture of democracy in the year 2020? What does the word mean? Has the world come to some agreement on it? Is there, on a whole, more of it than existed 10 years ago or less?
Michael Rubin: I'd define democracy not only as representative government accountable to the people, elections contested by political parties who have abandoned militias, and but also a proven record of peaceful transfers of power between government and opposition. I am an optimist and see the spread of democracy is inevitable. I also believe those who argue that certain cultures--Chinese or Arab, for example--are impervious to democracy are wrong. Here, Korea is instructive. Harry S Truman was lambasted for the Korean War and for attempts to bring democracy to South Korea. Critics said that democracy was alien to Korean culture, and it certainly was a process. But today, when we juxtapose North and South Korea, I doubt there are many people who do not believe the price was worth it. Taiwan, too, showed that democracy can thrive in Chinese culture and, while the Iraq war remains a polarizing debate, it is telling that ahead of the March 7 elections, no Iraqi knows who will lead their new government.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI.
Patrick Tucker, senior editor of the Futurist, interviewed AEI's Michael Rubin about his view of the future. Rubin's thoughts on Iran, China, the United States, and democracy are shared below.
The Futurist: What do you see as the best strategy the U.S. might employ to further the cause of human rights in Iran?
Rubin: First and foremost, the White House should use its bully pulpit. After this past summer's election protests erupted, the Obama administration muted its response, fearing that to throw support to the protestors might taint them. This is a valid concern, but there is no reason why the White House and the State Department can't speak up for broad principles, such as democracy, justice, free speech, and free association.
After the Berlin Wall fell, we discovered that Presidential rhetoric meant more to dissidents than we ever imagined. There's a tendency today to want to address human rights issues silently, but discreet diplomatic inquiries are rarely as effective as public support. Regimes prefer to murder in silence; when a dissident becomes a public symbol, not only does the cost associated with a dissident's imprisonment or murder increase, but the dissident's story can be a driving force in mobilizing public pressure, as it humanizes the abstract. We saw this in 1999, when Ahmad Batebi became a symbol of the student uprising when he appeared on the cover of the Economist holding a bloody shirt, and 16-year-old Neda, shot in the street by the paramilitary Basij, became a symbol of the situation in Iran in 2009.
There is no reason why the White House and the State Department can't speak up for broad principles, such as democracy, justice, free speech, and free association.
The U.S. government should take care against bestowing undue legitimacy upon the regime. When Iranians are taking to the streets in protest against not only the legitimacy of their post-election government, but also their system of government, the White House's reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran implies endorsement of the theocracy, and their efforts to engage a government which the Iranian electorate does not support also implies recognition. Instead, the White House and State Department might direct their comments to the Iranian public in general and, if necessary, simply refer to the 'Iranian government' or the 'regime,' as every president--whether Democrat or Republican--did until President Obama changed the formula.
Most controversially, it is important for the U.S. government to consider aid and assistance to Iranian civil society and independent media. For example, the State Department working through non-governmental intermediaries might assist programs which seek to document Iranian human rights abuses or help independent trade unions organize. Fears that U.S. funding might undercut the opposition and strengthen the regime are real, but misplaced. Opponents of civil society support argue that the presence of funding enables the Iranian government to taint all civil society work. The problem with this perspective, however, is that the Iranian regime always accuses its opponents of foreign connections regardless of U.S. action, so supporting civil society would not appreciably alter Iranian behavior. If fear of Iranian rhetoric toward its own internal opposition were to shape U.S. policy, then we'd also have to rule out dialogue, since Iranian security forces have taken to toward accusing any Iranian who engages with American institutions--Yale University and the Carnegie Endowment, for example--of treason.
The Futurist: What about in China, where the attendant economic risks from the Chinese sale of U.S. Treasuries are much greater?
Michael Rubin: U.S. support for human rights and free speech might antagonize the Chinese government a bit, but the chance that Beijing would respond in this fashion is slight to none. It's simply not in the interest of the Chinese government to sabotage the United States economy to that extent given the level of U.S.-Chinese trade. At the same time, turning a blind eye toward abuses in China also has some inherent, even if indirect, risk. The Chinese government has no incentive to reform and to correct government abuses against its citizenry. Economic disparities run deep from coast into heartland. Absent an outlet for dissent and a system which forces the government to be accountable to the people, there is an inherent risk of wildfire outbreaks of instability in China. Certainly, gentle U.S. prodding for democratization in China is in both our countries long-term interests.
The Futurist: Do you see the Iranian regime persisting in its present state until the year 2020? What might happen when it fades from existence?
Michael Rubin: If we take a snapshot of Iranian demography, it might look like the Islamic Republic is in trouble. The Iranian economy is stagnant, living standards are declining, and the regime can't provide enough work for young people finishing the university.
Time is, unfortunately, working in the regime's favor. In the years immediately after the Islamic Revolution and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged large families. The regime put up posters showing 'a good Islamic family' with a mother, a father, and six children. After the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, the Iranian government realized that it could not handle such a large population. Suddenly posters appeared depicting 'a good Islamic family' as having a mother, a father, and just two children.
As Patrick Clawson, an economist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy points out, the Iran-Iraq war years' baby boomers are in their 20s, precisely the age of the protestors. In five years, however, the number of 20-somthings is going to decline while the current protestors are going to be in their 30s, and beginning to settle down with young families, their personal priorities elsewhere.
The regime is nervous, though. There is no question that the regime is unpopular across a broad cross-section of society. The evidence for this is not only anecdotal, but also quantitative. Using Persian speakers in Los Angeles, polling companies have surveyed Iranians by taking every telephone exchange in Tehran, and randomizing the last four numbers and conducting what, on the surface is an economic survey but which also provides insight into political altitudes.
In September 2007, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reorganized and implemented what its new commander, Mohammad Ali Jafari, called the mosaic doctrine. Rather than orient the IRGC to defend against foreign armies--as it had been from the days of the Iran-Iraq War--Jafari divided the IRGC into inwardly-oriented units, one for each province and two for Tehran. Jafari argued that internal unrest and the possibility of a velvet revolution posed more of a threat to the regime than foreign armies, a judgment validated by the June 2009 unrest.
The key issue in regime survival therefore lies with the loyalty of the Revolutionary Guards. It matters not if 90% of the Iranian people turn against the regime so long as the IRGC remains loyal to the Supreme Leader. Western politicians can hope for muddle-through reform, but ultimately change will come when the IRGC defects, much like regime change came to Romania after Nikolai Ceausescu's security forces switched sides. The Iranian regime is aware of this, and so IRGC members are seldom stationed in their home provinces minimizing the risk that units will refuse to fire on crowds which might contain family members, friends, or neighbors.
If the Islamic Republic does not fall, then the regime will have made a Faustian bargain. The IRGC will become a predominant force, dominating not only political life, but also economic and religious life. What we are now seeing is a slow, creeping coup d'état. The Islamic Republic is becoming a military dictatorship, albeit one with a religious patina.
The Futurist: Of all the trends playing in terms of human rights at this moment, from China to Iran to the United States, which ones concern you the most? Which make you the most hopeful?
Michael Rubin: What concerns me most is cultural relativism--the willingness of Western states to accept the arguments of oppressive regimes that Eastern cultures simply do not uphold the same values of individual rights and Western demands that they should is simply new age imperialism. We see this primarily with regard to women and women's rights.
Communication offers the most hope. From telegram to radio to television to fax to IM and mobile camera and twitter, technology is empowering citizens and preventing human rights abusers from acting with impunity.
The Futurist: Paint us a picture of democracy in the year 2020? What does the word mean? Has the world come to some agreement on it? Is there, on a whole, more of it than existed 10 years ago or less?
Michael Rubin: I'd define democracy not only as representative government accountable to the people, elections contested by political parties who have abandoned militias, and but also a proven record of peaceful transfers of power between government and opposition. I am an optimist and see the spread of democracy is inevitable. I also believe those who argue that certain cultures--Chinese or Arab, for example--are impervious to democracy are wrong. Here, Korea is instructive. Harry S Truman was lambasted for the Korean War and for attempts to bring democracy to South Korea. Critics said that democracy was alien to Korean culture, and it certainly was a process. But today, when we juxtapose North and South Korea, I doubt there are many people who do not believe the price was worth it. Taiwan, too, showed that democracy can thrive in Chinese culture and, while the Iraq war remains a polarizing debate, it is telling that ahead of the March 7 elections, no Iraqi knows who will lead their new government.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)